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SCHREIBER v. CANADA (ATTORNEY GENERAL)
BY ROBERT

J.

CURRIEt

The Airbus scandal has been a matter of fairly intense political interest
since initial allegations of influence-peddling were made against several
parties, including former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. 1 Of legal
note, however, has been a challenge mounted by another party
implicated by the Department of Justice's investigation into the matter,
which has recently been pronounced upon by the Supreme Court of
Canada. The Court's judgment in Schreiber v. Canada (Attorney
General) 2 provides an interesting view of conflicting societal values:
the Charter-guaranteed freedom from unreasonable search and seizure
raised in opposition to the state's interest in efficient and unfettered
means through which to combat crime with a transnational aspect. The
Schreiber case is significant as an indicator both of the Court's evolving
view of the limits of the application of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, 3 and of the Court's perception of the course being
charted for Canada's participation in the fight against international
crime. The court's decision more generally highlights some of the
domestic implications of inter-state cooperation in the area of criminal
law. 4

t M.A. (Carleton), LL.B. (Dalhousie). LL.M. candidate, Edinburgh University. The author
wishes to thank Professor Stephen Coughlan of Dalhousie Law School for invaluable
comments on an earlier draft.
1
See "Mulroney Poised for New Lawsuit Over Airbus," Globe & Mail (18 November
1997) at A4. For further detail surrounding the case, see W. Kaplan, Presumed Guilty: Brian
Mulroney, the Airbus Affair and the Government of Canada (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart,
1998).
2
[1998] 1 S.C.R. 841
3 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Consitution Act 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
4
On Canadian practice in the area of mutual legal assistance in criminal matters generally,
and for a critique of the Federal Comi of Appeal's judgment in Schreiber, see R.J. Currie,
"Peace and Public Order: International Mutual Legal Assistance 'The Canadian Way"' (1998)
7 Dal. J. Leg. Stud. 91.
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I.

LOWER COURT JUDGMENTS

Karlheinz Schreiber was the subject of a criminal investigation on
kickbacks allegedly received by himself and other parties (including
Brian Mulroney) for the awarding of Canadian contracts from the
federal government to certain companies. During the investigation, a
letter of request5 was sent by the Attorney General of Canada to the
Swiss authorities requesting records of bank accounts held by Schreiber
in that country, and the records were seized in accordance with the
request. The Attorney General did not obtain a search warrant or other
judicial authorization in Canada prior to the request. In a special case
before the Federal Court Trial Division, 6 Schreiber contended that his
right to security against unreasonable search and seizure pursuant to
section 8 of the Charter had been infringed in the making of the request,
because the process for obtaining a warrant as set out by the Court in
Hunter et al. v. Southam Inc. 7 and Dyment 8 was not followed. The
Attorney General submitted that Schrieber' s privacy right was not
subject to Charter protection outside Canada, because section 8 does
not have extraterritorial effect. Since the actual search and seizure of
documents was made by the Swiss police, their action did not attract
Charter scrutiny. The Trial Division judge found in Schreiber's favour,
ruling that the Canadian standard for the issuance of a search warrant

5 This was a letters rogatory request. Letters rogatory is a means by which officials in one
state can make an official request of their counterparts in another for evidence which may be
located in the foreign jurisdiction; see S.A. Williams & J.G. Castel, Canadian Criminal Law:
International and Transnational Aspects (Toronto: Butterworths, 1981) at 321-32. In the
modern Canadian context, the Department of Justice executes such requests on behalf of the
Minister; see Department of Justice, Law Enforcement in the Global Village: A Manual
ForMutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (Ottawa: Dept. of Supply and Services,
1990). Mutual legal assistance has more recently been governed by formal treaty relationships.
The Treaty Between Canada and the Swiss Confederation on JV!utual Assistance in Criminal
Matters ([1995] Can. T.S. No. 24), which is the mechanism by which such matters would now
be carried out, had not come into effect when the request was made.
6
[1996] 3 F.C. 931, per Wetston J. This case was brought under Rule 475 of the Federal
Court Rules, C.R.C., c. 663.
7
Hunter et al. v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 [hereinafter Hunter]
8
R. v. Dyment, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417. This case and Hunter establish that, for a search and
seizure to be initiated, judicial approval on "reasonable and probable grounds" must be
obtained. See Hunter, ibid. at 160.
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was required to be satisfied before the Minister of Justice submitted the
letter of request to the Swiss authorities.
The ruling was upheld at the Federal Court of Appeal 9 by a
majority of two to one, but there was a strongly worded dissent by Stone
J .A. The disagreement turned on competing interpretations of the words
contained in section 8. The majority, relying on Hunter, used an
expansive characterization of the provision and focused on the
reasonable expectation of privacy afforded to the accused, rather than
the nature of the alleged violation. Io In accordance with Hunter and
Dyment, the judgment extended section 8 protection to the entire
process smTounding the search and seizure at bar, rather than just the
physical act. Schreiber' s Charter rights were judged to have been
engaged when the letter of request was sent, as this initiating action was
taken by a government body whose actions are subject to Charter
application.
The majority specifically rejected the submission of the Attorney
General that to extend Charter protection to the accused in such an
instance was to apply the Charter right extraten-itorially. Although it
acknowledged that a state cannot purport to fetter the activities of
another state's authorities in the criminal context due to sovereignty
concerns, the Comi in this respect separated activities by foreign
authorities from the investigative process being initiated on Canadian
soil. Insofar as a request is made by Canadian authorities for a search
and seizure with respect to an investigation into an offence under
Canadian law, the request itself had to conform with the Charter
requirements. I I
In his dissent, Stone J.A. took issue with the majority's
interpretation of the section 8 protection, stating that they had
incon-ectly emphasized the word "secure" at the expense of the words
"search and seizure." He concluded that the Charter right could not
apply to Mr. Schreiber because the documents were seized by the Swiss
[1997] 2 F.C. 176.
Ibid. at 228, per Linden J.
11
The Court appeared to find influential the fact that with the sending of the request, the
government had a "reasonable expectation of its acceptance, and a likelihood of it being acted
upon." It found that this was "sufficient to engage section 8 of the Charter, particularly when
the thrust of its protection ... is to institute a means of preventing unjustified searches before
they happen." Schreiber, supra note 9 at 237.
9

10
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police, operating under their own laws: "there was simply no "search"
or "seizure" in Canada to which section 8 ... could attach:" 12
To conclude that [section 8] is engaged because the Canadian
authorities sent the request to Switzerland even though they could not
and did not conduct any search and seizure there would be to contort
the language of this important protection and to give it application
where no governmental action of the kind envisaged by the section is
involved. 13

Finding that the Canadian authorities could not carry out the search and
seizure themselves, Stone, J.A. judged the request to be simply standard
intergovernmental cooperation that did not attract Charter scrutiny.

II.

THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA RULING

The Supreme Court of Canada, which sat with seven justices,
overturned the Federal Court of Appeal ruling and allowed the appeal.
The majority was written by L'Heureux-Dube J. and concurred with by
McLachlin, Bastarache and Binnie JJ. Chief Justice Larner concurred in
the result but wrote his own reasons. Iacobucci J. wrote a dissenting
judgment on behalf of himself and Gonthier J.
In a tersely worded judgment, the majority vindicated the view of
Stone J.A. at the Federal Court of Appeal, and expressly endorsed his
view of the status of the letter ofrequest. 14 L'Heureux-Dube J. began by
focusing on the letter of request as the discrete issue, stating that the
sending of the letter "is the only relevant action which was authorized
and undertaken by the government of Canada, and therefore the only
action which can be assessed for any impact on [Schreiber's] Charter
rights." 15 She then employed a domestic analogy, noting that if the
authorities of one Canadian province were to make a request of their
counterparts in another province for bank records residing there, no
Charter scrutiny would attach to the request itself because it "is not an
action which invades anyone's right to be secure against unreasonable
Supra
Supra
14
Supra
15
Supra

12
13

note
note
note
note

9
9
2
2

at
at
at
at

204.
207.
858.
859.
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search and seizure." 16 Applying the analogy, she noted that any actions
that had employed state compulsion to interfere with Schreiber' s
privacy had been carried out by the Swiss authorities and were therefore
unjusticiable in Canada. 17 The request itself was not such an action, and
thus Schreiber's section 8 right was not engaged:
The Charter does not protect everyone against unreasonable search
and seizure in the abstract. Rather, the Charter guarantees everyone
the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure by, inter
alia, the government of Canada .... Although I agree thats. 8 protects
"people, not places or things," it only protects people against actions
by the government of Canada that interfere with a person's privacy
interests .... [emphasis in original]. 18

L'Heureux-Dube J. then cited the finding of Stone J.A. that the use
of section 8 put forward by Schreiber would, if accepted, "contort the
language of this important protection." 19 She found further suppo1i in
the ruling of Dilks J. in R. v. Filonov, 20 where in considering a similar
request for assistance he had stated that "the sovereign authority of
Canada ends with the sending of the request," and further that:
the United States' part of the process was a discrete procedure carried
out by authorities who were in no way controlled by or answerable to
any Canadian authorities. The fact that the process was initiated by the
latter did nothing to make their United States counterparts agents of
the Canadian government. Even if they could be so considered, their
conduct would not be governed by the Charter unless the Charter
expressly said as much. 21

Supra note 2 at 860.
Supra note 2 at 860; R v. Teny, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 207 at 217.
18
Supra note 2 at 860-61.
19
Supra note 9 at 207.
20
(1993), 82 C.C.C. (3d) 516 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)), cited in Schreiber, supra note 2 at 861.
21
Filonov, ibid. at 522-23, cited in Schreiber, supra note 2. This citation and the implied
endorsement of the views expressed therein, may constitute L'Heureux-Dube J. 's contribution
to a judicial dialogue about the concept of inter-state agency that has been going on since
Filonov. In R. v. Teny, supra note 17 at 220, Justice McLachlin noted that, "even if one could
somehow classify [the U.S. police] as "agents" of the Canadian police, so long as they
operated in California they would be governed by California law." The Court felt it
unnecessary to decide on this factual issue. The statement was somewhat at odds with a dictum
by Laforest J. in R. v. Harrer [1995] 3 S.C.R. 562 at 571, where under similar circumstances
it was stated that "a different issue would also arise ifthe United States policemen ... had been
acting as agents of the Canadian police." In neither case did the Court make any mention of
what might constitute an "agency" relationship between police of different jurisdictions that
16

17
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The Court concluded by noting that even if evidence was obtained
unfairly by foreign authorities, it could be excluded at trial in Canada
through the application of section 7 of the Charter. 22
The remaining three Supreme Court of Canada judges disagreed
with the reasoning of the majority, though Lamer C.J. concurred in the
result. The Chief Justice treated the Attorney General's submission that
to apply section 8 to Schreiber was to apply the Charter
extraterritorially, which appears to have determined the majority's
finding, as a preliminary issue. Lamer C.J. found that "[i]t is clear that
the Charter in general applies to such letters of request" 23 in the instant
case because the request was made by Canadian authorities with regard
to bank records, which are "part of ... the biographical core of personal
information that individuals in a free and democratic society would wish
to maintain and control from dissemination to the state." 24 Suggesting,
however, that "expectations of privacy must necessarily vary with the
context," 25 he then found that Schreiber's reasonable expectation of
privacy was diminished by having his bank records located in another
state: "[Schreiber] must have reasonably expected that, if he did his
banking in Switzerland, his records could be searched in accordance
with Swiss law. Therefore, it cannot be said that his reasonable
expectation of privacy was violated."26 Accordingly, in Lamer C.J.'s
view, section 8 was not engaged.

would trigger an application of the Charter to the police in the requested state. Laforest J.'s
line of reasoning seems consistent with the opinion that he expressed in Harrer, at 570-71,
that the Charter may be applicable extraterritorially in some circumstances. Yet under what
conditions can the police of one jurisdiction, acting within their jurisdiction, be considered the
agents of another? McLachlin J. 's dictum seems to indicate that a Treaty request will not
actuate this relationship, and the Court's findings in both Harrer and Terry indicate that
informal police cooperation as well will not serve this purpose. Prior to Laforest J.'s departure
from the Court, it appeared that a notion of limited extrate1Titorial application of the Charter
was developing; the Schreiber judgment may represent a retreat from that development. But
see R. v. Cook, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 597.
For an examination of a case wherein public officials of one state were considered the
agents of another (albeit in the context of war crimes), see Finkelstein, "Changing Notions of
State Agency in International Law", (1995) 30 Texas Int. L. J. 261 at 267-70.
22
Supra note 2 at 863.
23
Supra note 2 at 853.
24 Supra note 2 at 856, citing Sopinka J. in R. v. Plant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281 at 293.
25
Supra note 2 at 854.
26 Supra note 2 at 858.
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Iacobucci J., writing in dissent on behalf of himself and Gonthier
J., took issue with the majority's focus on the location of the search,
stating that "[t]he focus of the right to privacy ... is the impact of an
unreasonable search or seizure on the individual; it matters not where
the search and seizure took place."27 He emphasized that the Court's
jurisprudence on section 8, especially since Hunter, has been geared
towards providing "ex ante protection for privacy rights, rather than
merely an ex post validation or condemnation of a state intrusion on an
individual's privacy" rights. 28 In the present case, Schreiber's
reasonable expectation of privacy had been violated by the entire
process surrounding the warrantless search of his bank records, of which
the letter of request was initiated by Canadian authorities and thus
caught by section 8. Taking the generous and purposive view proper to
Charter rights, he refused to limit scrutiny to the actions physically
undertaken on Canadian soil:
the issuing of the letter of request effectively puts the respondent's
privacy interests in jeopardy; section 8 therefore applies to balance the
interests of the state and those of the respondent through a judicial preauthorization procedure. 29

III. ANALYSIS
It has been intriguingly suggested that the basis of the disagreement
between the majority and the minority in Schreiber is interpretative,
namely, whether the letter can be considered a "search" for the purposes
of section 8. 30 On the dissenting side, if the foreign authorities are to
fulfill the Canadian request automatically, then the letter puts in motion
a process that may threaten a party's expectation of privacy and thus can
be considered to be a "search." From the majority's viewpoint, if the
letter is simply a request, which does not imply any execution by
Canadian authorities, then it does not by itself endanger any privacy
Supra note 2 at 866 [emphasis in original].
Supra note 2 at 866.
29
Supra note 2 at 873-74.
30
S. Coughlan, "Developments in Criminal Procedure: the 1997-98 Term," (1999) 10
S.C.L.R.
27

28
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interest and is not a "search." The inevitability of the foreign authority
complying with the request, which both the Federal Court of Appeal and
Iacobucci J. appeared to find detenninative, is beside the point; Charter
protection stops at the border.
It is to be noted that underlying policy considerations will play a
part in considering the effect of this judgment. Had the Federal Court of
Appeal decision been upheld, every mutual legal assistance request for a
procedure, whether under treaty or by letters rogatory, would have to
have been preceded by a request for a warrant by the Attorney General.
It is not unreasonable to suggest that this potential result motivated the
Department of Justice in pursuing the appeal to the count1y's highest
court. And it is policy reasons, tempered with notions of legal fairness,
which give rise to the current submission: the majority judgment,
despite a seeming departure from the Court's previous section 8
jurisprudence, is substantially the correct one. The key to understanding
the judgment is in recognizing that the case does not fit comfortably into
Charter jurisprudence respecting entirely domestic matters. Rather, it
exists within a certain class of cases wherein the Court has explored how
the realities of international investigation can place closer limits on
certain rights that are found domestically. It is an indicator both of the
Court's view of the limits of Charter application, and of its recognition
that combatting transnational crime requires the state to have special
tools at its disposal. Schreiber is an important case, in that it fmiher
balances individual rights with international investigative necessity.
There may, however, have been another means by which to strike the
balance.
The majority decision is substantially compelling on its own
merits. The Charter applies to protect Schreiber from threats to his
reasonable expectation of privacy through the use of search and seizure
(section 8) by Canadian authorities (section 32). 31 A request of the Swiss
government to retrieve documents is not, in and of itself, an action that
threatens this reasonable expectation. The process undergone by the
31
Section 32 reads: "(!) This Charter applies (a) to the Parliament and government of
Canada in respect of all matters within the authority of Parliament including all matters
relating to the Yukon Territory and North West Territories; and (b) to the legislature and
government of each province in respect of all matters within the authority of the legislature of
each province." Constitution Act, 1982, s. 32, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982
(U .K. ), 1982, c. 11.
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Swiss authorities, which may or may not involve some procedural
evaluation of Schreiber's privacy rights under Swiss law, 32 is not within
the reach of Charter examination as this would give the Charter
impermissible extraterritorial effect. 33 Schreiber is not entitled to
Canadian standards of privacy with regard to his accounts in
Switzerland. 34 As such, the locus of the search and seizure is not within
the Court's area ofinquiry, and the simple act ofrequest does not engage
the section 8 right.
Moreover, the Court's decision also reflects the realities of interjurisdictional cooperation in criminal matters. The finding that the
Attorney General had, in the sending of the request, a "reasonable
expectation of its acceptance, and a likelihood of it being acted upon,"
heavily influenced both the Federal Court of Appeal and the Supreme
Court dissent in terms of engaging Schreiber's section 8 rights.
However, the decisive point may be that the reception of such requests
by foreign authorities is at base variable, and subject to refusal on the
part of the requested state. This is particularly trne of situations like
Schreiber, which occurred in the context of a letters rogatory request. 35
The requested state is free to accept or reject the request for assistance
from Canada, and this acceptance or rejection will take place within the
context of the requested state's laws, subject to treaty obligations. The
Canadian letter ofrequest may thus be accepted or rejected-a situation
that clearly militates against its being considered as part of a process

The majority judgment noted that neither party led evidence on Swiss law, Schreiber,
supra note 2 at 858.
33
Per Laforest J. in R. v. Harrer, supra note 21 at 574: "Canada cannot impose its
procedural requirements in proceedings undertaken by other states in their own territories."
See also R. v. Teny, supra note 17 at 217. Such an imposition would seem to offend the "act of
state" doctrine, which stipulates that the courts of one jurisdiction will not inquire as to the
legality of the actions of the government in another jurisdiction. See Laane and Baltser v. The
Estonian State Cargo & Passenger Steamship Line, [ 1949] S.C.R. 530; see also H.M. Kindred,
"Acts of State and the Application ofinternational Law in Canadian Courts", (1979) 10 Revue
de Droit Sherbrooke 271.
34
An excerpt from Lamer J.'s concurring minority opinion is informative in this regard:
"having sought the benefit of foreign laws in choosing to place his or her funds under the
jurisdiction of a foreign state, the client must also accept their burden ... he or she cannot
reasonably expect more privacy than he or she is entitled to under that foreign law;" Schreiber,
supra note 2 at 857.
35
This is also true of requests that are made under a treaty arrangement, although the
grounds for refusal are generally delimited; see Currie, supra note 4 at 97.
32
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endangering the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy. This
supports the Court's conclusion that the act of sending such a letter does
not itself trigger section 8.
The Court intimated a further basis for its finding that it did not
expand upon. It may also be argued that sending a letter of request
necessarily engages a foreign legal process, and must of necessity not be
subject to Charter scrutiny. When the letter of request is sent, the
Attorney General is effectively at the mercy of the foreign jurisdiction's
procedural machinery. This machinery will evaluate the legality of a
requested search and seizure, for example, an evaluation that could be
analogous to Canada's warrant system. Although a Canadian court
might be tempted to consider the letter as part of a process that could
endanger the individual's section 8 rights, the outcome of the request
depends entirely upon the findings of a foreign legal process to which
the Charter is not subject. Canadian courts cannot examine the legality
of any other state's domestic actions, due both to domestic
jurisprudence and quasi-international law principles. 36 Thus the Charter
inquiry is halted at its logical point: the Canadian border.
For its part, the dissent casts doubt on what is admittedly quite a
literal reading of section 8. Iacobucci J. 's insistence that the section
must be applied so as to provide ex ante protection is also consistent
with the Comi's previous jurisprudence, in particular Hunter and
Dyment; the dilemma would seem to be whether the Court's concern
with not pushing the Charter beyond Canadian borders necessarily
trumps a broad and purposive application of its protections. Such a
reading, argues the minority, shows the delimiting of the letter of
request as "not a search" to be somewhat aiiificial. Schreiber was the
subject of a Canadian criminal investigation, undertaken by Canadian
authorities, and any evidence obtained through the search would be used
against him in a Canadian trial. The action of sending the request must
have an impact on the reasonable expectation of privacy to which
Schreiber, the person, is entitled. The majority's focus on the
inapplicability of the Charter to the locus of the search may deny the
highly personal protection which section 8 affords. Although the Swiss
authorities may not have been acting as "agents" of the government of
Canada in any legal capacity, would the reasonable person not note that
36

Supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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Canadian objectives were nonetheless achieved? The well-reasoned
opinion of the Federal Court of Appeal majority commented on this
point, cautioning that "[a] government cannot use the need for
international assistance as an excuse to justify its own constitutionally
impermissible conduct."37 In this way, too, a lack of judicial preapproval for assistance requests may allow the Canadian authorities to
engage in an evidential "fishing trip" in foreign jurisdictions. A
vaguely-worded request, to the government of a state with little or no
judicial screening of such requests itself, would surely run the risk of
seriously invading the individual's privacy.
Moreover, the protection provided by section 7 may also be
considered through the lens of section 8, and be found wanting. Even if
evidence is excluded at trial as a result of having been taken unfairly, 38
this simply serves to colour the invasion of privacy that the taking of the
evidence has involved, as well as weakening what Iacobucci J. refeITed
to as the "prophylactic" nature of the section 8 right. 39 The dissent points
to L'Heureux Dube J.'s own prior comment on the matter: "[t]he
essence of privacy ... is that once invaded, it can seldom be regained." 40
That the Cami's invocation of section 741 does not accord with the
Hunter provision of ex ante protection for the privacy right seems
obvious.
The contradiction between these views can be resolved, however,
by the understanding that the facts in Schreiber were evaluated by both
the majority and the dissent in terms that echo the Court's previous
section 8 jurisprudence, when in fact the nexus between Charter
application and the international aspect was central. The majority
perhaps under-emphasizes that its judgment is consistent with its own
"jurisprudence on matters involving Canada's international cooperation in criminal investigations and prosecutions."42 The Court has
Supra note 9 at 226.
Even the likelihood of this is somewhat questionable, as comis have a tendency to "fit in"
all evidence which they consider relevant; see D. Stuart, "Eight Plus Twenty-Four Two Equal
Zero" (1998), 13 C.R. (5'11 ) 50.
39
Supra note 2 at 867.
40
Supra note 2 at 866, citing R. v. 0 'Connor, [ 1995] 4 S.C.R. 4 I 1 at 486.
41
Supra note 2 at 863. See also the discussion accompanying note 21 at 7.
42
Supra note 2 at 862, citing Canada v. Schmidt, [1987] I S.C.R. 500 at 5 I 8-19; Argentina
v. Me/lino, [1987] I S.C.R. 536 at 547; Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1991] 2
S.C.R. 779, per Laforest J. at 83 I, and per McLachlin J. at 846.
37

38
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indeed been quite consistent in separating the conduct of Canadian
authorities and that of states receiving Canadian requests for
cooperation: the Charter clearly applies to the former, and just as clearly
does not apply to the latter. 43 Any constitutional constraint of police or
other authoritative interference with the individual stops at the border.
This would be harsh indeed if the object of an investigation were to find
herself, or her bank records, in a jurisdiction unconcerned with
individual rights. However, the Court in Schreiber acknowledges that
some protection in such instances may be provided through a section 7
exclusion of evidence "where it is necessary to preserve the fairness of
the trial." 44 As such, this may be viewed as a case about how much
latitude will be given to Canadian authorities investigating a crime with
transnational implications. Reading the judgment in this manner, rather
than strictly within the context of domestic section 8 parlance, tempers a
great deal of the concern expressed by the dissent.

IV. A

POLICY CONCLUSION

It is clear, however, that an evaluation of the Schreiber case through the
lens of section 8 as laid out in Hunter and Dyment will raise certain
doubts as to the constitutionality of requests for judicial assistance.
What is also clear is that the government of Canada views it to be in the
best interests of Canadians for the Attorney General to have an efficient
and reasonably unfettered capacity to investigate potential criminal
activity that has a trans-border aspect. Transnational crime is of a
notoriously difficult and intransigent nature from an investigative point
of view, as criminals can take advantage of states' jurisdictional
entanglements to profit from illicit activities. Although the malfeasant is
free to move between jurisdictions in pursuing ill-gotten gain,
sovereignty concerns often impair effective cooperation by
governments in combating this type of crime. Where the criminal
jurisdiction is one of the most closely guarded aspects of national
affairs, 45 states are constrained from providing needed evidence or
43
44
45

See R. v. Terry, supra note 17 at 216; R. v. Harrer, supra note 21 at 574.
Supra note 2 at 863.
Currie, supra note 4 at 93.
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information to others through outdated norms or simple lack of
established process. This is especially true of international money
laundering, an area where bank records are central to an investigation. 46
The Supreme Court of Canada has taken note of the increasing
importance of the fight against international crime. In United States of
America v. Cotroni, 47 the Court stated:
The investigation, prosecution and suppression of crime for the
protection of the citizen and the maintenance of peace and public order
is an important goal of all organized societies. The pursuit of that goal
cannot realistically be confined within national boundaries. That has
long been the case, but it is increasingly evident today. 48

Given this perspective, it is submitted that, even if the letter of request
had been found to violate Schreiber's section 8 rights, the Court would
have determined that it was justified under section 1 of the Charter.
Arguably a section 1 analysis could be employed based upon the fact
that such "international cases" will be evaluated differently from a
section 8 violation within a purely domestic context. Such a
justification, involving as it would an application of the Oakes test, 49
would require that the citizen's right of individual privacy be balanced
against the interest of the state in engaging in international criminal
cooperation in an efficient and effective manner. This area of state
intrusion into the individual's affairs is of a fairly unique variety, and
occurs under limited circumstances. Allowing unfettered international
cooperation in evidence gathering, while providing under sections 7 and
11 (b) for exclusion of such evidence as is deemed impermissible at trial,
surely does not lower the Charter bar unacceptably.

See generally W.C. Gilmore, ed., lntemational Efforts to Combat Money Laundering,
Cambridge International Documents Series, vol. 4 (Cambridge: Grotius in Association With
the Commonwealth Secretariat, London, 1992).
47
,[1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469.
48
Ibid. at 1485.
49
R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.
46

